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PLACEMENT DIRECTORS

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics, University of Maryland at College Park, expected May 2022
M.A. Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business, 2018
B.A. Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, 2017

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary: Industrial Organization
Secondary: Microeconomic Theory, Applied Econometrics

DISSERTATION

Essays on Online Platform Economics and Sponsored Search Auctions

Committee: Prof. Andrew Sweeting (Chair), Prof. Ginger Zhe Jin, Prof. Daniel Vincent, Prof. Chenyu Yang

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Information, Bias, and Revenues in Sponsored Search Auctions”

Many internet platforms use sponsored search auctions as their primary source of revenue. In these auctions, advertisers bid for slots with different desirabilities. A standard assumption is that bidders know the click through rate (CTR) for each slot. I relax this assumption in two ways. First, I allow bidders to receive private signals about the CTR of the highest advertising slot, which they use to update their beliefs during an auction. Second, I allow for bidders to start each auction with different priors. I estimate my model using closed-form formulae and a new dataset from a large internet platform where the CTR for the highest slot varies significantly across auctions and over time. My estimates imply considerable variation in bidders' priors, and that this affects platform revenues. Specifically, I predict that the platform's revenues would increase by an average of 7% if the platform was able to credibly and accurately reveal the CTR of the highest slot. I show how this gain in revenues relates to changes in revenue from bidders who, in the absence of knowledge of the CTR, have either optimistic or pessimistic priors about the CTR.

OTHER RESEARCH PAPERS

“Optimal Reserve Prices with Endogenous Demand: A Field Experiment,” 2021, under review

“The Tragedy of Commons in the Taxi Industry: A Case for a Central Dispatcher,” 2021, under review

“A Field Experiment on Hybrid and Second Price Rules in Internet Advertising Auctions,” 2020, working paper

“Granularity of Bidding Language in Online Auctions”, work in progress

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Winter 2020, Summer 2019

Instructor, Industrial Organization (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Winter 2019

Teaching Assistant, Microeconomic Analysis (graduate), University of Maryland, Fall 2021

Teaching Assistant, Economic Applications of R Programming (graduate), University of Maryland, Fall 2021

Teaching Assistant, Microeconomic Analysis II (core graduate), University of Maryland, Spring 2020

Teaching Assistant, Microeconomic Analysis I (core graduate), University of Maryland, Fall 2019

Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomics (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Spring 2019, Fall 2018, Spring 2018 and Fall 2017

RESEARCH AND RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE

Auction Researcher, Tripadvisor, Boston, August 2020- May 2021

Auction Consultant Intern, Power Auctions, Washington, DC, May 2019- August 2019

Game Theory Assistant Intern, The Johns Hopkins University (CTY), June 2018- August 2018

GRANTS AND AWARDS

Third Year Paper Award, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2020

Gerontelis Foundation Fellowship, 2018

Full-Tuition Scholarship for highest GPA, Athens University of Economics and Business, 2017

International Institute of Forecasters Award, National Technical University of Athens, 2015

Papakyriakopoulos Mathematics Grant, National Technical University of Athens, 2011

CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

Economics Graduate Student Conference at Washington University of St. Louis, 2021 (Information, Bias, and Revenues in Sponsored Search Auctions)

Annual Meetings of the Missouri Valley Economic Association, 2021 (Information, Bias, and Revenues in Sponsored Search Auctions)

LANGUAGES

Greek (native), English (fluent), German (fluent)

COMPUTATIONAL SKILLS

Python, R, Matlab, Stata, C

REFERENCES

Prof. Andrew Sweeting University of Maryland atsweet@umd.edu (301) 405-8325

Prof. Ginger Zhe Jin University of Maryland jin@econ.umd.edu (301) 405-3484

Prof. Daniel Vincent University of Maryland dvincent@umd.edu (301) 405-3485