Daniel R. Vincent, Professor, received his PhD in economics from Princeton University in 1987. He was a Rhodes Scholar and received an MA from Oxford and a BA in History from the University of Toronto. Before joining the University of Maryland, he taught at the University of Western Ontario, the Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at Northwestern University and at the California Institute of Technology.

His main area of research is the application of game theory to trading environments. He has studied dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and the theory of auctions. His current research is on revenue maximizing selling mechanisms for sellers with more than one object - an area sometimes referred to as "multidimensional mechanism design." Other research interests include industrial organization theory, with a focus on two-sided markets and on antitrust issues. In 1999, he was a visiting scholar at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Recent papers are “Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments (with A. Manelli, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2019) and “Platform competition with user rebates under no-surcharge rules (with Marius Schwartz in the Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming). Other papers are "Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in the independent private values model" (with A. Manelli, Econometrica, 2010), "Multidimensional mechanism design" and "Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multi-good monopolist" (both jointly authored with Alejandro Manelli and both in the Journal of Economic Theory) as well as "The No Surcharge Rule and Buyer Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payments Network" with Marius Schwartz in the Review of Network Economics.