Daniel R. Vincent, Professor, received his PhD in economics from Princeton University in 1987. He was a Rhodes Scholar and received an MA from Oxford and a BA in History from the University of Toronto. Before joining the University of Maryland, he taught at the University of Western Ontario, the Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at Northwestern University and at the California Institute of Technology.
His main area of research is the application of game theory to trading environments. He has studied dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and the theory of auctions. His current research is on revenue maximizing selling mechanisms for sellers with more than one object - an area sometimes referred to as "multidimensional mechanism design." Other research interests include industrial organization theory, with a focus on two-sided markets and on antitrust issues. In 1999, he was a visiting scholar at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Recent papers are “Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments (with A. Manelli, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2019) and “Platform competition with user rebates under no-surcharge rules (with Marius Schwartz in the Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming). Other papers are "Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in the independent private values model" (with A. Manelli, Econometrica, 2010), "Multidimensional mechanism design" and "Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multi-good monopolist" (both jointly authored with Alejandro Manelli and both in the Journal of Economic Theory) as well as "The No Surcharge Rule and Buyer Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payments Network" with Marius Schwartz in the Review of Network Economics.
Areas of Interest
- Application of Game Theory to Trading Environments
- Auction Theory
- Game Theory
- Antitrust Economics
- Two-sided Markets
Degree TypePhDDegree DetailsPrinceton University, 1987
Degree TypeMADegree DetailsOxford University
Degree TypeBADegree DetailsUniversity of Toronto
|Course Name||Course Title||Semester||Syllabus|
|ECON415||Market Design||Fall 2017|
|ECON708||Advanced Topics in Applied and Theoretical Microeconomics||Spring 2017|
|ECON868||Workshop in Industrial Organization||Spring 2017|
|ECON662||Theories of Industrial Organization||Fall 2016|
|ECON708||Advanced Topics in Applied and Theoretical Microeconomics||Fall 2016|
|ECON868||Workshop in Industrial Organization||Fall 2016|
|ECON415||Market Design||Fall 2016|
|ECON708||Advanced Topics in Applied and Theoretical Microeconomics||Spring 2016|
|ECON868||Workshop in Industrial Organization||Spring 2016|
|ECON662||Theories of Industrial Organization||Fall 2015||Syllabus|
- Mixed Bundling and Imperfect Competition, , Working paper, May .
- Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple Good Monopoly: A Corrigendum, , Journal of Economic Theory 147(6 ), 2492-2493, November .
- Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private Values Model, , Econometrica 78(6 ), 1905-1938, November .
- Quantity ‘Forcing’ and Exclusion: Bundled Discounts and Non Linear Pricing., , Issues in Competition Law and Policy, April .
- Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple Good Monopoly, , Journal of Economic Theory 137(1 ), 153-185, November .
- Bundling as an Optimal Selling Mechanism for a Multiple-Good Monopolist, , Journal of Economic Theory 127(1 ), 1-35, March .
- The No Surcharge Rule and Buyer Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payments Networks, , Review of Network Economics 5(1 ), 72-102, January .
- Duality in Procurement Design, , Journal of Mathematical Economics 40(3 ), 411-428, June .
- How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids with an Application to Real Estate Auctions, , Journal of Industrial Economics 50(4 ), 391-416, December .
- Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations, , International Economic Review 43(4 ), 1035-1052, November .
- Tarrifying Auctions, , The RAND Journal of Economics
- Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships, , International Economic Review 39(2 ), 275-293, May .
- Sequentially Optimal Auctions, , Games and Economic Behavior 18(2 ), 246-276, February .
- Bidding off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret., , Journal of Economic Theory 65(2 ), 575-584, April .
- Optimal Procurement Mechanisms, , Econometrica 63(3 ), 591-620, May .
- Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers, , Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 2(4 ), 449-482, December .
- The Declining Price Anomaly, , Journal of Economic Theory 60(1 ), 191-212, June .
- Modelling Competitive Behavior, , Rand Journal of Economics 23(4 ), 590-599, December .
- Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions, , American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 82(2 ), 512-518, May .
- Delayed Agreements and Nonexpected Utility, , Games and Economic Behavior 3(4 ), 423-437, November .
- Dynamic Auctions, , Review of Economic Studies 57(1 ), 49-61, January .
- Bargaining With Common Values, , Journal of Economic Theory 48(1 ), 47-62, June .
Haiwen ZhouProfessor, Old Dominion University
Niswan ErkalProfessor, University of Melbourne
Kyeong Hoon KangKorea Institute of Finance
Vesela GrozevaErnst and Young
Adriana VamosiuProfessor, University of San Diego
Heisnam SinghPrice Waterhouse Cooper
Terence JohnsonUniversity of Notre Dame
Shunjie TuFreddy Mac
- Shunjie Tu